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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical markets are characterised by price inelastic demand, mainly due to extensive
medical insurance, and supply-side market power associated with the patent system protecting
new chemical entities from being copied within a given period. This combination has lead most
countries to exert various means to curb the pharmaceutical firms’ market power and to control
the growth in medical expenditures.1
Two of the most commonly used price control mechanisms in pharmaceutical markets are
price cap regulation and reference pricing. While the two systems share the same purpose,
namely to contain (the growth in) medical expenditures, they diﬀer substantially in nature.
Price cap regulation limits the pharmaceutical firms’ ability to exploit market power by charging
high prices, while reference pricing aims at stimulating competition by making demand for
pharmaceuticals more price elastic. The link between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical
firms’ pricing strategies has received surprisingly little attention in the literature, and the main
purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.2
We exploit a unique policy experiment from Norway to assess the relative performance of
reference pricing and price cap regulation. In 2003 the Norwegian government introduced a
reference price system called "index pricing" to a set of oﬀ-patent pharmaceuticals, replacing
the existing price cap regime, which was based on international price comparisons. Since only
a sub-sample of the oﬀ-patent drugs was exposed to reference pricing, the policy reform can be
classified as a quasi-natural experiment. We exploit a rich product level panel dataset covering
a four-year period from 2001 to 2005. Besides having data on all drugs exposed to the reference
price system, we also have data on a substantial number of drugs still subject to the existing
price cap regulation. This latter group of drugs consists of drugs that are either therapeutic
substitutes or unrelated in consumption to the drugs exposed to reference pricing. In addition
to exploiting the before-after reform variation in prices, we make use of the non-included drugs
1The US is the exception among Western countries. However, the recent inclusion of prescription drugs
in Medicare has spurred a debate of price controls also in the US (e.g., Huskamp et al, 2000, Kanavos and
Reinhardt, 2003). In addition, (generic) reference pricing is well-established through the "maximum allowable
charge" programs used by, e.g., Medicaid.
2Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview over issues and related literature on price regulation in phar-
maceutical markets. For reference price systems, see the literature surveys by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy
(2000), Danzon (2001) and Puig-Junoy (2005).
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as a comparison group to identify the price eﬀects on the drugs subject to the policy experiment,
as well as any cross-price eﬀects on therapeutic substitutes not exposed to the experiment.
Under price cap regulation, the regulator sets a maximum price that can be charged for
each product. The price cap is set when a new patent-protected drug enters the market. To be
eﬀective (binding), the price cap needs to be lower than the firms’ profit-maximising (monopoly)
price. Competition can, however, induce the firms to reduce the price on the original brand-name
drug below the price cap level. First, if a new drug with similar therapeutic properties enters
the market, the original drug can be forced to set a lower price to avoid loosing too much of its
market share. Second, when the original drug looses its patent protection, generic substitutes
can enter the market with lower prices to capture market shares from the original drug. Our
dataset allows us to identify the price eﬀects due to therapeutic competition (first type) and
generic competition (second type).3
Under reference pricing, the regulator enforces no explicit restrictions on the pharmaceutical
firms’ price setting. The firms are allowed to charge any price they like. Instead the regulator
sets a maximum reimbursement price (the reference price) to be paid for a group of drugs
("clusters").4 Purchase of drugs with price above the reference price results in a surcharge
equal to the diﬀerence between the drug’s price and the reference price.5 This surcharge may
be imposed by the regulator on the consumer, the prescribing physician, or, as in Norway, the
dispensing pharmacy. The intention is to make demand more sensitive to prices, which may
trigger price competition and, in turn, result in lower prices and medical expenditures.
We find that the reference price system introduced in Norway had a strong price reducing
eﬀect on the drugs exposed to this regime, with the eﬀect being stronger for brand-names (18
to 19 percent) than generics (7 to 8 percent). This confirms that reference pricing triggers price
competition within the cluster of drugs exposed to the regime. Since the reference price system
in Norway included oﬀ-patent products only, the identified price eﬀect is solely due to generic
3We do not analyse the impact of (generic) entry on drug prices. This has been the subject of several papers,
e.g., Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Frank and Salkever (1997).
4The definition of clusters is a controversial issue. It is common to distinguish between generic and therapeutic
reference pricing, where the former involves clustering of drugs that are chemically identical (generics), while the
latter involves clustering of drugs that have similar therapeutic eﬀects (therapeutic substitutes). We return to
this issue in the next section.
5Often the reference price is set equal to the lowest priced drug in the cluster. However, if this is not the
case, the diﬀerence between the reference price and a lower priced drug is often shared between the payer and the
dispensing pharmacy to create incentives to also sell those drugs (Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000).
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competition triggered by the reform.
Interestingly, we also identify a negative cross-price eﬀect of the policy reform on the non-
included therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation, providing evidence on thera-
peutic competition in the market. The eﬀect is weaker (2.2 percent), as we would expect, since
these drugs have diﬀerent chemical substances and therefore are only imperfect substitutes to
the drugs exposed to reference pricing. When we decompose the eﬀect, we find that it is merely
the generics that respond to the reform (by 6.4 percent). An obvious explanation is that the
price cap is binding for the brand-names but not for the generics. This implies that we capture
any price reductions on the generics, while for brand-names we observe only price reductions
below the price cap. However, under free pricing, or less strict price regulation, it is likely that
also the brand-names will reduce their prices as a response to the lower prices triggered by
reference pricing.
The Norwegian policy experiment provides an excellent opportunity to assess the relative
performance of two diﬀerent regulatory regimes; reference pricing and price cap regulation. Our
results suggest that reference pricing is more eﬀective than price cap regulation in reducing drug
prices. To indicate the economic significance of the reform, we can calculate potential savings in
medical expenditures, using 2002, the year before the reform was introduced, as our benchmark.
In 2002, the total sales value of the drugs included in the reference price system amounted to
474.4 mill NOK, with a brand-name market share of about 72 percent. Using our estimated
price reductions of about 18 percent on brand-names and 8 percent of generics, we obtain cost
saving of about 75 mill NOK. This is a conservative figure for two reasons. First, the reference
price system is likely to trigger a shift in market shares from the brand-names to the generics
(e.g., Aronsson et al., 2001). Second, when extending the reform to the whole generic market
segment, the savings (in absolute terms) will be even higher.
A potential downside of the reference price system is related to the negative cross-price eﬀect
on non-included therapeutic substitutes, which raises two concerns: first, that reference pricing
may reduce patent rent, which in turn can aﬀect national launching decisions and global inno-
vation incentives (if applied in large, high-income countries); and, second, that reference pricing
may potentially distort drug consumption towards less eﬀective or suitable drug treatments in
order to obtain economic savings (lower patient co-payments) or gains (higher pharmacy margins
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or physician budgets).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we relate our paper to existing
literature. In section 3, we present institutional facts about the Norwegian pharmaceutical
market, the regulatory regime and the policy reform introducing reference pricing. In section 4,
we present our dataset and some descriptive statistics. In section 5, we carry out the econometric
analysis and report our empirical results. Finally, in section 6, concluding remarks are presented.
2 Related Literature
The literature on the performance of diﬀerent regulatory regimes on pharmaceutical price setting
is limited, and many of the empirical studies are descriptive.6 Our paper is a contribution in
that respect. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Below we relate our paper to these.
In a theoretical paper, Danzon and Lui (1996) argues that all prices within the cluster will
converge towards the reference price, implying a price decrease on the high-price (brand-name)
drugs and a price increase on the low-price (generic) drugs, leaving the net price and cost saving
eﬀect of reference pricing unclear.7 Moreover, Zweifel and Grivelli (1997), who provide a theory
model and some anecdotal evidence from Germany, suggest that the reference pricing produces
an immediate reduction in brand-name prices to the reference price level but has no eﬀect on
generics.
However, more recent studies, including ours, find a negative eﬀect of reference pricing not
only on brand-names but indeed also on generics. Aronsson et al. (2001) analyse how brand-
name market shares are aﬀected by generic competition, in general, and (generic) reference
pricing, in particular. Using data from Sweden for the time period 1972-96, they find that the
price of brand-name relative to the average price of generics aﬀects the brand-name market
share for 5 out of 12 diﬀerent substances. Extending the model to capture the eﬀect of the
reference price system introduced in 1993, they provide evidence that reference pricing had a
6See the literature surveys by Danzon (1997), Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000), Danzon (2001), and
Puig-Junoy (2005).
7This result relies on the assumptions that the reference price is set above the lowest price in the reference
cluster and that demand is perfectly inelastic below the reference price. However, many countries set the reference
price equal to the lowest price, and those that don’t often share the benefit from selling a drug with a price below
the reference price with the dispensing pharmacy. Moreover, if there is coinsurance, where the patient pay a
fraction of the drug price, demand is likely to be elastic also under the reference price.
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negative eﬀect on brand-name market share, but only for 3 substances. However, as the authors
point out themselves, they have an identification problem because the reference price system is
likely to aﬀect the relative prices on brand-names and generics directly. They therefore perform
a test on the price eﬀects of reference prices, which indicates a strong negative eﬀect on both
brand-names and generics.
A more recent study by Bergman and Rudholm (2003), also based on Swedish data, analyses
the impact of actual and potential competition between brand-names and generics, where ‘po-
tential competition’ is defined as a situation where the brand-name’s patent has expired but no
generics have entered. Using data on 18 substances for the same period as the previous study
(1972-96), they find that the price of the brand-name is lowered by both actual and potential
generic competition. Importantly, the reference price system introduced in 1993 also had a
strong negative eﬀect (16-21 percent) on brand-name prices, but only for the drugs facing actual
competition.
Pavcnik (2002), which is the closest study to ours, analyses the impact of the introduction
of (therapeutic) reference pricing in Germany in 1989 on pharmaceutical prices, focusing on the
change in patient out-of-pocket expenses. Using data on two diﬀerent therapeutic fields (oral
antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for the time period 1986-96, she identifies strong price decreases
for both brand-names and generics, with the price reductions being more pronounced for the
brand-names. She also finds that brand-names with more generic competitors reduced prices
more.
Finally, there exists a recent paper by Dalen et al. (2005) analysing the same policy reform
in Norway (the index price system) as we do. They use a structural approach, with prices as
instruments, to estimate the impact of the reform on demand and market power, and concludes
that the index price system increased the market shares of generic drugs and reduced overall
market power. However, their dataset only covers the six chemical substances subject to the
reference price system, as well as a limited number of pharmacies (22 of about 500).
The policy experiment in Norway enables us to advance the literature along several dimen-
sions. First, it allows us to establish a proper comparison group to carefully estimate the net
price eﬀect of the reference price system. The previously mentioned studies resort to comparison
of prices and/or market shares before and after the introduction of reference pricing. In Sweden
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there was no policy experiment since all oﬀ-patent drugs were exposed to reference pricing in
1993. Dalen et al. (2005) could have made use of the policy experiment in Norway, but did not
by focusing only on the drugs exposed to reference pricing. The exception is Pavcnik (2002)
who exploits the gradually extension of the reference price system within the oral antidiabetic
group in Germany to establish a comparison group. A potential problem with her comparison
group is that it consists of therapeutic substitutes to the ones exposed to reference pricing, and,
as our results show, there may be cross-price eﬀects that can potentially bias the results.
Second, the policy experiment allows us to analyse generic and therapeutic competition.
Generic competition has received substantial attention in the literature, possibly because of
the so-called "generic paradox", where empirical studies have shown that brand-name drugs
respond to generic entry by rising their prices (see e.g., Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank
and Salkever, 1997).8 The evidence from the Swedish market provided by Aaronsson et al.
(2001) and Bergman and Rudholm (2003) and the German based study by Pavcnik (2002) do
not support the "generic paradox" result. All studies find that generic entry or competition
results in lower brand-name prices, which is also confirmed by our study. However, it is very
likely that the diﬀerence in results may be due to diﬀerent market structures and regulatory
regimes in the US compared with European countries.
The literature on therapeutic competition is much more limited. An important exception
is Ellison et al. (1997) that use US data from one therapeutic field (cephalosporin), provid-
ing evidence of high elasticities between generic substitutes and also significant, though lower,
elasticities between therapeutic substitutes. Consistent with Ellison et al. (1997), we provide
evidence of therapeutic competition in the pharmaceutical market, although this competition
is, as one would expect, weaker than competition from generic substitutes.
Finally, our study also contributes to the debate on generic versus therapeutic reference
pricing.9 Generic reference pricing (like in Norway and Sweden) is considered to be uncontro-
versial in contrast to therapeutic reference pricing (like in Germany) for two reasons: First, since
generic reference pricing only concerns drugs with the same active chemical substances, health
8The "generic paradox" have been challenged by, for instance, Caves et al. (1991) who find that generic entry
is associated with brand-name prices reductions. However, the reductions are economically small, much smaller
than one would expect from products that are supposed to be perfect substitutes.
9Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) and Danzon (2001) provide a detailed presentation of the arguments
in the debate between generic and therapeutic reference pricing.
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risks associated with generic substitution are considered to be very limited. Second, since generic
reference pricing applies by definition to oﬀ-patent drugs only, it is perceived to not aﬀect the
patent protection, and thus market entry and innovation decisions.
A theoretical paper by Brekke et al. (2005) show that this is not necessarily true. Using a
model combining generic and therapeutic competition, they find that generic reference pricing
triggers lower prices on non-included therapeutic substitutes and exposes patients to higher
health risks than therapeutic reference pricing. The reason is that generic reference pricing
results in larger price diﬀerences, and thus copayments, between included (oﬀ-patent) drugs
and non-included (on-patent) drugs than therapeutic reference pricing, which induces a larger
fraction of patients to purchase a cheaper but perhaps less eﬀective/suitable oﬀ-patent drug.
Our data does not enable us to test the eﬀect of reference pricing on the patients’ health risk
or the market entry and innovation incentives of the firms.10 However, we provide evidence on
a negative cross-price eﬀect of the generic reference price system on therapeutic substitutes not
subject to this system. This confirms the concern raised by Brekke et al. (2005) that not only
therapeutic reference pricing but also generic reference pricing may reduce patent protection
and potentially expose patients to health risks.
3 The Norwegian Pharmaceutical Market
The Norwegian pharmaceutical market is extensively regulated, as in most other countries. The
regulatory body is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services and its agency called
the Norwegian Medicines Agency. Norway has adopted the European patent law system to a
large extent, implying that all new chemical entities are subject to patent protection for a given
period. However, the pharmaceutical firms still need government approval to launch a new
product in Norway. In addition, they must submit an application providing suﬃcient evidence
of benefits compared with costs from the drug therapy in order to get the drug listed in the
reimbursement system (the blue list). Once this is obtained, the prices are subject to price
control.
10A paper by Danzon and Ketchham (2004) analyses the eﬀect of reference pricing on the availability of drugs
in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand, providing results that indicate that the strictness of the reference
price systems tends to lower the number of drugs available in a country.
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The current system is a price cap scheme based on international reference pricing. This
system was introduced in 2001, and covers all prescription drugs, both on-patent and oﬀ-patent,
except for those included in the reference price system. The price cap is defined as the weighted
sum of the three lowest prices of a specific drug in a basket of countries that is "comparable"
to Norway.11 The price cap is imposed at the wholesale level, leaving the producer prices
unregulated. The government then defines a maximum product-specific mark-up, which in turn
determines the price cap on the retail price of each product.
The reference price system, called index pricing, was introduced in March 2003 for a subsam-
ple of oﬀ-patent pharmaceuticals facing generic competition. Initially, the index price system
covered six chemical substances: Citalopram (depression), Omeprazol (antiulcer), Cetirizin (al-
lergy), Loratadin (allergy), Enalapril (high blood pressure) and Lisinopril (high blood pressure).
In June 2004 Simavastatin (high cholesterol) was included. The government decided to termi-
nate the system by the end of 2004, arguing that the price reductions and cost savings were
lower than expected.12 Thus, in total the system run for almost two years.
The index price was calculated as follows. First, the drugs were classified into clusters
based on chemical substance. Then within each cluster, the drugs were classified into subgroups
depending on the package size and dosage in order to adjust for cost variation. Second, the
index price was calculated as the sales weighted sum of producer prices of the drugs included
in each subgroup. For the six chemical substances initially included, there were 16 index prices
in total. This exercise were repeated every three months, resulting in a revised index price for
every quarter of a year. Formally, the index price for a given period t, denoted by It, can be
defined as:
It =
XN
i=1
£
M t−1i · pt−1i
¤
, where M t−1i =
qt−1iPN
j=1 q
t−1
j
.
where pt−1i is the producer price of product i in the previous period (t− 1), qt−1i is the quantity
sold of product i in the previous period, measured in tablets or defined daily doses (DDD),
11The following countries are included in the Norwegian basket: Austria, Belgium, Danmark, Finland, Germany,
Irland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Thus, Southern and Eastern Europian countries, as well as France
and Switzerland, are excluded. If there are no prices yet in these countries, the price is determined by negotiations
based on the provided evidence on benefit and costs of the medical treatment in question.
12The decision was based on an evaluation report, using data until February 2004. As will be shown below,
our analysis strongly indicates that the evaluation was carried out too early. Price reductions became substantial
after some time, especially during 2004.
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and, thus, M t−1i is the market share of product i in the previous period. Since each period
t lasts for three months, all variables are average values. The index price was the maximum
reimbursement for every drug in the reference group. We see that the index price is reduced
if lower-priced (generic) drugs increase their market share, and/or if there is a price decrease
of the higher-priced (brand-name) drugs and/or the lower-priced (generic) drugs generic in the
cluster.
A special feature of the Norwegian reference price system relative to other reference price
systems is that the pharmacies were exposed to all incentives. Not only did they keep the
margin of selling a (generic) drug with a price lower than the index price, but they also had
to bear the full cost of selling a (brand-name) drug with a price higher than the index price.
Importantly, generic substitution was allowed in 2001, so the pharmacies could suggest a cheaper
(generic) drug, although the physicians had written a brand-name drug on the prescription
(which they frequently tend to do). If the patients refused to accept a generic substitution, they
had to pay the surcharge associated with the diﬀerence between the high-priced (brand-name)
drug and the index price, as is common in most other reference price systems. On the other
hand, the physicians could blockade generic substitution by actively writing an argument on the
prescription of why this particular patient is better oﬀ with the brand-name drug. In such cases,
the price cap system was reintroduced.
In Norway there is a statutory public health insurance, covering the whole population. Close
to 70 percent of the total drug expenses are covered by this insurance scheme. For prescription
drugs on the reimbursement list (the blue list), patients pay a fixed share (36 percent) of the
drug price, constrained by a maximum amount per prescription (400 NOK) and per year (1.350
NOK). Notably, the index price system did not change the structure of the patient copayments,
except for the case when the patients refused to accept a cheaper generic drug, as described
above. However, the amount of the patient copayments may, of course, be aﬀected to the extent
that the reference pricing aﬀects prices and choices of pharmaceuticals.
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4 Data and Descriptive Results
4.1 Data
In the empirical analysis we use data from Farmastat.13 Their database includes information on
sales value and volume for each package of drugs sold at the Norwegian pharmaceutical market.
Values are in pharmacy purchase prices and volumes in defined daily doses (DDD) for the active
substance according to the ATC-code system.14 The database also provides information about
product name, manufacturer, launch date, price cap, whether the product is a brand-name or a
generic drug, package size and dosage.
From this database we have data on all prescription drugs within the 30 largest ATC-groups
(in terms of sales value) over a four year period from 2001 to 2005. Table 1 lists ATC-code,
brand-name, and manufacturer of these pharmaceuticals. The table also gives information about
whether the drugs within each ATC-code are subject to reference pricing, whether the branded
drug faces generic competition, and whether a drug is classified as a therapeutic competitor to a
drug in the reference price group. This last classification is based on therapeutic categories. For
example, Losec with ATC-code A02BC01 is included in the index price system, and therefore
all pharmaceuticals with A02 as the first three characters in the ATC-code are classified as
therapeutic competitors to Losec.
[ Table 1 about here ]
In our analysis, we define a product as all presentations of a given drug produced by a
given manufacturer. For example, the brand-name Zantac together with five generic products
give a total of six products in ATC-group A02BA02. For each product, prices are calculated
as total sales values divided by the total volume sold (in DDD). All prices therefore refer to
average prices per defined daily dose of the active ingredient; a price measure that enables
comparison across diﬀerent formulations (tablets, capsules, etc.) within each product, and also
13Farmastat is a company specialised in provision of pharmaceutical statistics. The company is owned by the
Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.
14The ATC-code system is used by the World Health Organization to classify pharmaceutical substances accord-
ing to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Pharmaceuticals sharing the same seven-figure
ATC-code have the same active ingredients and are considered equivalent in the treatment of a given disease.
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across diﬀerent active ingredients. The prices have been deflated using the consumer-price index.
Time is measured in one-month periods, and the average price of each product in each time-
period constitutes an observation. The number of observations is not identical in each period,
which is due to generic entry during our sample period. In such cases, the product does not
appear in our data, leaving us with an unbalanced panel. The number of observations within
each ATC-group is given in the last column in Table 1. The total number of observations in our
analysis is 2765.
4.2 Descriptive results
A natural starting point for the descriptive analysis is to look at how average prices have de-
veloped over time. In Figure 1, we plot average prices for brand-names and generics for the
following three groups of pharmaceuticals: (i) the pharmaceuticals subject to reference pric-
ing, (ii) the drugs that are therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation, and (iii) the
others, which are independent in consumption and exposed to price cap regulation.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
With time measured in one-month periods, the reference price regulation was introduced in
period 27 in the figure. Average prices of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing display
a pronounced decrease after the implementation of the reform. In Table 2, we have calculated
the average price in the periods before and after the implementation of the index price system.
We find that average prices in the pre-regulation period is about 4.7 NOK, while average prices
during reference pricing is about 3.3 NOK. This implies a price reduction of more than 29
percent. Turning to the therapeutic competitor group, we find a somewhat similar price pattern
as in the group of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing prior to the reform, but the
decrease in average prices after the reform is much smaller, about 12 percent. The average
prices in the “others” group show a quite diﬀerent price pattern; a large decline in the first part
of the reference price period is followed by an increase in the second part of this period.
[ Table 2 about here ]
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To get a better understanding of the price patterns depicted in Figure 1, we plot the average
prices of brand-names and generics together with the average price cap for the three groups. In
Figure 2, we see that the average price of the brand-name drugs has been steadily decreasing
after the implementation of the reference price regulation. Interestingly, in the post-regulation
period, average prices of generic drugs follow almost the same price pattern as brand-name
pharmaceuticals. The large variation in the average price of the generics in the period before
the reform is almost entirely due to entry of new generic drugs. In Figure 1A in the Appendix,
we have plotted the same average prices as in Figure 2, but only included generics that have
been in the market during the entire sample period. From this figure, we see that the average
price of generics follows the same trend as the average prices of brand-names.
[ Figure 2-4 about here ]
From Figure 3 and 4, we see that average prices of brand-names in the therapeutic competitor
group and the “others” group follow the maximum price over the entire period. This indicates
that the reference price regulation had a small, if any eﬀect on the price setting of brand-name
drugs in the group of pharmaceuticals not directly aﬀected by the regulation. However, average
prices of generic drugs in the therapeutic competitor group follow the same pattern as prices
for generics in the reference pricing group, which indicates that much of the price reduction in
the "therapeutic competitor" group is explained by a reduction in prices on generic drugs. An
obvious reason is that the price cap is binding for the brand-names but not for the generics. As
a consequence, we will observe any price reduction on the generics, while for brand-names we
observe only price reductions below the price cap.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Design and econometric model
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 4 suggest a strong, negative price response on
pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing. There are also some indications of a negative
cross-price eﬀect of the reform on non-included therapeutic competitors. In this section, we
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present an econometric framework to analyse the price eﬀects of the reform more carefully.
Ideally, in order to estimate the eﬀect of introducing reference pricing, we would like to know
what the prices on the products aﬀected by the reform would have been had the reform not been
imposed on them. Since we only observe prices for these products with the imposed reform, we
let the prices from a set of other comparable products represent the counterfactual. Having panel
data, we are able to compare inter-temporal variation in prices before and after the imposition
of the reform. Therefore, identification relies not only on before-after comparison, but also on
comparison of price variation for drugs subject to the reform with price variation for comparable
drugs not subject to the reform.
Our econometric framework is based on an application of a model used in numerous evalu-
ation studies (e.g., Ashenfelter 1978; Card and Sullivan 1988; Lavy 2002; Pavcnik 2002), where
(permanent) unobserved diﬀerences between pharmaceuticals are controlled for by including
product fixed eﬀects in the model. Following the convention from this literature, we use the
notion ‘treatment group’ for the pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing, while pharmaceu-
ticals not subject to the reform are used as a comparison group.
In this section, we closely follow Lavy (2002) and Pavcnik (2002). Let the dummy variable
Dit indicate treatment status for a given product, and let Pit (0) indicate the price of product
i in period t if the product is not exposed to treatment (Dit = 0). The fixed eﬀect model then
implies that the price of any untreated product i at time t can be written as
Pit (0) = X0itβ + ai + δt + εit. (1)
Here, ai is a product fixed eﬀect, δt is a period specific eﬀect common to all products,
εit represents unobserved time varying factors that aﬀect prices, and X0it contains observable
variables. In the model, the error term εit is allowed to be correlated with ai, but not with the
treatment status Dit.
We assume a constant price eﬀect of the reform, measured by α, and the post-reform prices
for pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing becomes: Pit (1) = Pit (0) + α. Using Pit (1),
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Pit (0) and equation (1), the observed price for product i in time period t can be written as
Pit = Pit (0) (1−Dit) + Pit (1)Dit
= X0itβ + ai + δt + αDit + εit, (2)
where the error term εit is assumed to be uncorrelated with Dit. This assumption has several
testable implications: first, any price diﬀerences prior to the reform between products in the
treatment group and products in the comparison group can be explained by observable variables
and the product specific eﬀect ai. Second, after controlling for observables and the product
specific eﬀects, the price trend for drugs in the comparison group should not be significantly
diﬀerent in the post-reform period compared with the pre-reform period.
Since Dit is an interaction term15 equal to 1 for products subject to the reform and 0 for
all other drugs, then α is the estimated total eﬀect of introducing reference pricing. However,
previous studies have found that prices on brand-names and generics adjust diﬀerently to price
regulations (e.g., Aronsson et al., 2001, Pavcnik, 2002). To distinguish between brand-names and
generics, we therefore interact Dit with a dummy Bi that equals 1 if product i is a brand-name.
We are also interested in whether there is a cross-price eﬀect of reference pricing on thera-
peutic competitors. Pharmaceuticals with diﬀerent chemical compounds but similar therapeutic
eﬀects are typically substitutes in treatment. It is therefore likely that price responses triggered
by the reference price system may influence the pricing of non-included therapeutic substitutes.16
To estimate such eﬀects, we introduce the variables DTCit and DTCit ∗Bi, where DTCit is the
interaction between a dummy indicating observations in the post-reform periods and a dummy
indicating whether or not a product is a therapeutic competitor. After taking the natural log
of prices, our estimating equation thus becomes
lnPit = X0itβ + ai + δt + α1Dit + α2Dit ∗Bi (3)
+α3DTCit + α4DTCit ∗Bi + εit.
15For products within six of the seven therapeutic substances subjected to the reference price system, this
variable equals zero for period t = 1, . . . , 26, and one for period t = 27, . . . , 48. For products within the seventh
substance, that was included as of June 2004, the variable equals zero up to period t = 41 and one thereafter.
16Ellison et al. (1997) provide evidence of negative price elasticities between drugs with diﬀerent chemical
compounds but therapeutically similar eﬀects.
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Note that we by this specification have two diﬀerent treatment groups. The first group
consists of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing, the second group of their therapeutic
competitors, while the drugs in the "others" group serve as our comparison group. Excluding
the therapeutic competitors from the comparison group enables us to capture potential cross-
price eﬀects, and also ensures that the comparison group consists of drugs not aﬀected by the
reform. In the next section, we conduct tests that provide evidence that the "others" group is
a valid comparison group.
The direct price eﬀect of the reform is measured by α1 and α2. α1 is the estimated price
eﬀect of the reform on generics subject to reference pricing, α2 measures whether reference
pricing influences brand-names diﬀerently than generics, and thus α1 + α2 is the price eﬀect on
brand-names subject to the reform. In a similar way, the two coeﬃcients α3 and α4 measure
the cross price eﬀect of the reform on brand-names and generics in the therapeutic competitor
group.
Within equation (3), ai control for time constant product specific factors (both observed
and unobserved) that aﬀect prices, while the period specific eﬀect, δt, control for time-varying
factors that aﬀect prices equally for all pharmaceuticals. X0it consists of variables controlling
for price cap regulation and the degree of competition. To control for price cap regulation, we
include the natural log of the average price cap faced by product i at time t, lnPCAP . From the
figures in Section 4, we see that the brand-name prices follow the price cap level quite closely.
Since the price cap is binding for the brand-names, we expect the sign of this variable to be
positive; a lower price cap yields lower average prices, and vice versa. By including the price cap
in our regressions, we ensure that the estimated eﬀect of the reference price system is directly
compared with the price cap regime.17
To control for the degree of competition, we calculate the Herfindahl index, measuring the
degree of concentration within a therapeutic substance group. The Herfindal index will be max-
imised (take the value of 10.000) in case of only one product within substance group, capturing
that a drug is still under patent protection and/or there is no (generic) competition. As compe-
tition increases, the index becomes lower. We therefore expect the estimated coeﬃcient to have
17As explained in Section 3, the price caps were still calculated for the drugs subject to reference pricing in case
the physicians restricted generic substitution or the patients refused to purchase a cheaper generic drug.
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a positive sign, i.e., that higher market concentration support higher prices.
5.2 Empirical Results
As noted in the previous section, our estimating strategy relies on that drugs in the comparison
group are "comparable" to drugs in the treatment groups, except for not being treated. Even
though the figures in section 4 showed quite similar price trends for all three groups of pharma-
ceuticals prior to the reform, this assumption should be tested more thoroughly. We therefore
start out this section by presenting results from two tests of the comparison group: first, in the
pre-reform period, after controlling for covariates and product specific eﬀects, the price trends
for pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing should not be diﬀerent from the price trends
for pharmaceuticals not included in the reform. Second, after controlling for covariates and
product specific eﬀects, the price trends for pharmaceuticals in the comparison group should
not be diﬀerent in the post-reform period compared with the pre-reform period.
In the first test, we run regressions on pre-reform data, where we regress log prices on period
dummies and period dummies interacted with a dummy variable indicating treated products.
We also control for changes in the price cap level, the degree of competition and product specific
eﬀects. If the interactions are jointly insignificant, this is an indication of a legitimate control
group, i.e., that unobservable factors aﬀecting price setting are uncorrelated with the probability
that a given product is in the treatment group. In column 2-4 in table 3, we present results where
price trends for pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing are compared with price trends for
pharmaceuticals in the control group (others group). The first model uses the period just prior
to the reform (period 26) as the base group, the second model uses period 13 as the base group,
and in the third model we use the first period in our dataset as the base group. The three last
columns in table 3 give similar comparisons of the therapeutic competitors and the comparison
group. Despite a few significant interactions in model 3 and 6, we find the results from these
regressions quite conclusive due to the fact that joint insignificants of the interactions are not
rejected in any model.
[ Table 3 about here ]
In the second test, we restrict our sample to pharmaceuticals in the comparison group and
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regress log prices on a dummy variable equalling 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise.
In the regression, we control for period dummies, the price cap level, the degree of competition,
and a product specific eﬀects. The dummy variable has no significant eﬀect on prices, and clearly
indicates that price trends for drugs in the comparison group are not aﬀected by the reference
pricing reform. On the basis of the results from these tests, we conclude that the "others" group
is a legitimate comparison group.
[ Table 4 about here ]
We start out by estimating a fixed eﬀect model based on a simple version of equation (3),
where we focus on pharmaceuticals exposed to reference pricing only, not distinguish between
brands and generics.18 We see from model 1 in table 4 that the estimated eﬀect of the reform is
a price reduction of about 24 percent. Not surprisingly, this is in line with the results reported in
table 2, where we compared the average prices before and after the introduction of the reference
price system. In model 2, we allow for brand-names and generics to be aﬀected diﬀerently
by the reform. Similar to Aronsson et al. (2001) and Pavcnik (2002), our results show that
reference pricing triggers a stronger price reduction on brand-names (30 percent) than generics
(19 percent).
So far we have not taken price cap regulation into account. From figure 1-4 we see that the
brand-name prices follow the price cap quite closely. Since the development of the price cap
diﬀers among the three groups, it is important to control for changes in the price cap level. We
find an estimated elasticity of around 0.74 (model 3), which clearly demonstrates the importance
of this variable in the price setting behaviour of pharmaceutical companies. By comparing R-
squared in model 2 and 3, we find that this variable accounts for about 50 percent of the
explained within-group variation in the dependent variable in our sample. More importantly,
after controlling for this variable, we find that the estimated price eﬀect of the reference price
system is substantially lower. The price reduction for brand-names is about 18 percent, while
generics face a price reduction of about 7 percent. This result is not surprising since we see from
18 In the models in table 4, we have tested for three diﬀerent time specifications; year dummies, period dummies
and a time trend variable. In terms of R-squared, we found that the best specification was the one with period
dummies.
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figure 2-4 that the drugs included in the reference price system face a reduction in the price cap,
while the price cap for those not included is more stable.
Turning to a potential cross price eﬀect, we find that prices on products that are therapeutic
substitutes to those included in the reference price system have responded to the reform as well.
On average, prices on therapeutic substitutes are reduced by 2.2 percent (model 4). However,
a separation of the eﬀect on brand-names and generics (model 5) reveals that it is merely the
prices on therapeutic generics that respond to the reform, by price reduction of 6.4 percent,
whereas the eﬀect on branded therapeutic substitutes is statistically insignificant by a F-test
and close to zero. A possible explanation is that the price cap is binding for the brand-names
but not for the generics. This implies that we capture any price reductions on the generics,
while for brand-names we observe only price reductions below the price cap. However, under
free pricing, or less strict price regulation, it is likely that also the brand-names will reduce their
prices as a response to the lower prices triggered by reference pricing.
Finally, in model 6, we control for the degree of competition by using the Herfindahl index.
The estimated eﬀect of this variable turns out to be statistically insignificant. However, due to a
possible endogeneity problem, the result must be interpreted with some care. For example, the
probability of generic entry in a marked segment might be influenced by higher prices because of
higher anticipated profit. This suggests a negative correlation between prices and the Herfindahl
index, which indicates a downward bias in our estimates. One possible solution to this problem
is to instrument for the variable, i.e., finding a variable that aﬀects the market concentration but
not directly aﬀects the prices of existing products. However, since the estimated price eﬀects of
the reform are unaﬀected by the inclusion of the competition variable, and since it is hard to
find good instruments, we choose not to do so in this study.
To summarize this section, we find that the introduction of reference pricing has led to an
average price reduction of about 18 percent on brand names and 8 percent on generics. The
reference pricing system also have a negative price eﬀect on generics in therapeutic substitute
group of about 6 percent. We have tested the robustness of these results by running a number
of regressions, where we experiment with diﬀerent model specifications, diﬀerent comparison
groups and the length of time periods. For example, we have estimated model 1 to 6 using a
comparison group consisting of oﬀ-patent drugs facing generic competition only; we have tried
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to include diﬀerent competition variables, like the number of generics and whether or not there is
generic competition; we have also estimated the models using two and three month time periods.
In all of these diﬀerent regressions, we got results that did not diﬀer substantially from those
reported in Table 4.19
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing
strategies, focusing on the relative performance of reference pricing and price cap regulation. A
unique policy experiment from Norway, where a sub-sample of oﬀ-patent drugs was exposed to
reference pricing, has been exploited to carefully identify the eﬀects on pharmaceutical prices.
Our analysis showed that the reference pricing system induced lower prices of both brand-names
and generics exposed to the system. In addition, we identified a negative cross-price eﬀect
on therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation. Notably, our results are robust to
diﬀerent model specifications and choices of comparison groups, as discussed in the previous
section.
We believe these results are interesting for several reasons. First, the results show that
pharmaceutical firms’ respond to diﬀerent regulatory regimes. In particular, reference pricing
tends to trigger price competition and lead to lower prices than price cap regulation. This
price response is not obvious considering the complicated structure of demand and supply in
the pharmaceutical industry, including the presence of insurance and informational asymmetries.
Some have also questioned whether reference pricing actually triggers competition (e.g., Danzon,
2001, Puig-Junoy, 2005). However, the pro-competitive eﬀect seems very robust, as several recent
studies, including ours, report lower prices and/or higher generic market shares due to reference
pricing (Aronsson et al., 2001, Pavcnik, 2002, Bergman and Rudholm, 2003, Dalen et al., 2005).
Second, the policy experiment enables us to provide evidence, not only on generic compe-
tition, but, importantly, also on therapeutic competition. The negative cross-price eﬀect on
the therapeutic substitutes not exposed to the reference price system shows that there exists
therapeutic competition in the market. The eﬀect is, though, weaker than the direct price ef-
19The results from these regressions are avaiable from the authors upon request.
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fect, which is consistent with Ellison et al. (1997) who show that generics are closer substitutes
than brand-names with diﬀerent chemical ingredients but similar therapeutic properties, a very
intuitive result.
Third, the results provide some information in terms of policy implications. Reference pricing
turns out to be more eﬀective than price cap regulation in lowering drug prices. Assuming
that total demand (not individual market shares) is relatively inelastic, this strongly indicates
that reference pricing is superior in reducing medical expenditures. To indicate the economic
significance of the reform, we can calculate the potential savings in medical expenditures. In
2002 the total sales value of the drugs included in the reference price system amounted to 474.4
mill NOK, with a brand-name market share of about 72 percent. Using our estimated price
reductions of about 18 percent on brand-names and 8 percent of generics, we obtain cost saving
of about 75 mill NOK. This is a conservative figure of two reasons. First, the reference price
system is likely to trigger a shift in market shares from the brand-names to the generics (e.g.,
Aronsson et al., 2001). Second, when extending the reform to the whole generic market segment,
the savings (in absolute terms) will be even higher.
However, the negative cross-price eﬀect on therapeutic substitutes outside the system points
at a potential detrimental aspect of reference pricing, namely that it may aﬀect the patent rent
and potentially stifle innovation. Clearly, this is not a great concern if only Norway introduced
such a system, but reference pricing has become increasingly popular worldwide. In addition,
the cross-price eﬀect indicates that even generic, not just therapeutic, reference pricing may
induce patients to trade-oﬀ health gains against lower co-payments.
Finally, we would like to emphasis that our study does not perform a social welfare analysis of
the diﬀerent regulatory regimes. A complete welfare analysis would have to measure the eﬀects
of the reference price system on patients’ health condition, the pharmaceutical firms’ profits and
innovation incentives, and, eventually, on the medical expenditures, potentially including the
costs of public funds. Although our paper provides some partial information about profits and
expenditures, through the price eﬀects, a complete welfare analysis is outside the scope of the
current paper and left for future research.
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7 Appendix
[ Figure 1A about here ]
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
ATC-
group 
Drug subject to 
reference 
pricing 
Therapeutic 
competitor 
Brand name Manufacturer Number of 
generics 
Number of 
observations 
A02BA02 No Yes ZANTAC GLAXOSMITHKLIN 5 254 
A02BC01 Yes No LOSEC      ASTRAZENECA 1 86 
A02BC03 No Yes LANZO WYETH-LEDERLE 0 48 
A02BC05 No Yes NEXIUM ASTRAZENECA 0 48 
C07AB02 No No SELO-ZOK ASTRAZENECA 3 109 
C07AB03 No No TENORMIN PFIZER 5 242 
C09AA02 Yes No RENITEC  MSD 3 131 
C09AA03 Yes No VIVATEC 
ZESTRIL 
ASTRAZENECA 
MSD 
4 205 
C09BA02 No Yes RENITEC 
COMP 
MSD 1 72 
C09CA01 No Yes COZAAR MSD 0 48 
C09DA01 No Yes COZAAR 
COMP  
MSD 0 48 
C10AA01 Yes  (1.6.2004) No ZOCOR MSD 2 82 
C10AA03 No Yes PRAVACHOL B-MYERS SQUIBB 0 48 
C10AA05 No Yes LIPITOR PFIZER 0 48 
G04BE03 No No VIAGRA PFIZER 0 48 
L02BB03 No No CASODEX ASTRAZENECA 0 48 
M01AH01 No No CELEBRA PFIZER 0 48 
M01AH02 No No VIOXX MSD 0 45 
M05BA04 No No FOSAMAX MSD 0 48 
N02BE01 No No PANODIL GLAXOSMITHKLIN 4 240 
N02CC01 No No IMIGRAN GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0 48 
N05AH03 No No ZYPREXA ELI LILLY 0 48 
N06AB04 Yes No CIPRAMIL LUNDBECK 3 112 
N06AB05 No Yes SEROXAT GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0 48 
N06AB06 No Yes ZOLOFT PFIZER 0 48 
N06AX03 No Yes TOLVON ORGANON 1 96 
R03AK06 No No SERETIDE GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0 48 
R03AK07 No No SYMBICORT ASTRAZENECA 0 44 
R06AE07 Yes No REACTINE  
ZYRTEC 
PFIZER  
UCB 
3 151 
R06AX13 Yes No CLARITYN  SCHERING-PLOUGH 4 176 
Total     37 2765 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average prices before and after reference pricing. 
 Prices before  Prices after Percentage price 
change 
Drug subject to 
reference pricing 
4.66 (3.18) 3.48 (2.23) -25.32% 
Therapeutic 
competitors  
6.95 (2.78) 6.09 (2.55) -12.37% 
Other drugs 14.21 (16.89) 14.05 (16.34) -0.01% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Testing for pre-reform differences in price trends between groups of products. Fixed 
effect results with robust standard errors. 
 Reference price group vs. others group Therapeutic competitors vs. others 
group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Period 26 
base group 
Period 13 
base group 
Period 1 
base group 
Period 26 
base group 
Period 13 
base group 
Period 1 
base group 
Interaction period 1 .043 (.045) .024 (.025) - -.009 (.029) -.022 (.019) - 
Interaction period 2   .026 (.044) .006 (.023) -.018 (.029) -.010 (.029) -.024 (.019) -.001 (.018) 
Interaction period 3 .031 (.043) .012 (.021) -.012 (.027) -.005 (.028) -.019 (.018) .004 (.016) 
Interaction period 4 .057 (.046) .038 (.027) .014 (.033) -.008 (.036) -.022 (.029) .001 (.028) 
Interaction period 5 .023 (.041) .004 (.017) -.020 (.024) -.021 (.032) -.035 (.025) -.013 (.023) 
Interaction period 6 .016 (.042) -.003 (.018) -.027 (.025) .002 (.034) -.011 (.027) .011 (.025) 
Interaction period 7 .008 (.040) -.011 (.016) -.035 (.024) .009 (.030) -.004 (.020) .018 (.019) 
Interaction period 8   .007 (.040) -.013 (.015) -.036 (.023) .014 (.029) .000 (.020) .022 (.018) 
Interaction period 9 .009 (.039) -.010 (.014) -.034 (.023) .017 (.029) .003 (.019) .025 (.018) 
Interaction period 10 .009 (.039) -.010 (.014) -.034 (.023) .020 (.029) .006 (.019) .028 (.018) 
Interaction period 11 .056 (.056) .037 (.040) .013 (.043) .002 (.032) -.011 (.025) .011 (.024) 
Interaction period 12 .049 (.049) -.029 (.032) .006 (.036) .007 (.031) -.007 (.023) .015 (.021) 
Interaction period 13 .019 (.039) - -.024 (.025) .014 (.030) - .022 (.019) 
Interaction period 14 .045 (.041) .026 (.023) -.002 (.030) .020 (.029) .006 (.020) .029 (.020) 
Interaction period 15 .043 (.040) .024 (.022) -.000 (.029) .015 (.030) .001 (.021) .024 (.020) 
Interaction period 16 .065 (.044) .045 (.027) .021 (.032) .028 (.034) .014 (.027) 036 (.026) 
Interaction period 17 .024 (.039) .005 (.022) -.020 (.030) .038 (.032) .024 (.024) .047* (.023) 
Interaction period 18 .026 (.038) .007 (.020) -.017 (.029) .040 (.030) .026 (.022) .049* (.021) 
Interaction period 19 .015 (.036) -.005 (.020) -.028 (.029) .046 (.032) .032 (.024) .055* (.024) 
Interaction period 20 -.014 (.038) -.033 (.024) -.057 (.031) .030 (.035) .016 (.028) .039 (.027) 
Interaction period 21 -.029 (.039) -.048 (.026) -.072* (.033) .028 (.034) .014 (.027) .037 (.026) 
Interaction period 22 -.033 (.039) -.052 (.030) -.076* (.037) .010 (.035) -.003 (.028) .019 (.028) 
Interaction period 23 -.019 (.037) -.038 (.025) -.062 (.034) .013 (.034) -.001 (.027) .022 (.026) 
Interaction period 24 -.033 (.037) -.043 (.025) -.076* (.034) .010 (.034) -.004 (.027) .019 (.026) 
Interaction period 25 -.035 (.043) -.054 (.035) -.078 (.042) .012 (.039) -.002 (.034) .021 (.033) 
Interaction period 26 - -.019 (.039) -.043 (.045) - -.014 (.030) .009 (.029) 
Ln price cap .707** (.058) .707** (.058) .707** (.058) .604** (.047) .605** (.047) .604** (.047) 
Herfindahl-index/100 -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint insignificance of 
interactions (Prob>F) 
.818 .763 .214 .619 .887 .097 
Number of 
observations 
965 965 965 1397 1397 1397 
Number of products 47 47 47 65 65 65 
R-squared .53 .53 .53 .50 .50 .50 
*: significant at the 5% level. **: significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4. Testing for pre- and post-reform differences in price trends for drugs in the 
comparison group. Fixed effect results with robust standard errors. 
 (1) 
Reform dummy -.007 (.023) 
Ln price cap .778** (.019) 
Herfindahl-index/100 .003 (.007) 
Constant .294 ** (.074) 
Period dummies Yes 
Number of observations 1016 
Number of products 24 
R-squared  .69 
**: significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 5. Price effects of reference pricing. Fixed effect results with robust standard errors. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Products subject to reference 
pricing 
-.242** 
(.015) 
-.189** 
(.019) 
-.070** 
(.017) 
-.079** 
(.018) 
-.080** 
(.018) 
-.076** 
(.020) 
Branded products subject to 
reference pricing 
 -.110** 
(.026) 
-.109** 
(.021) 
-.109** 
(.021) 
-.109** 
(.021) 
-.107** 
(.021) 
Ln price cap   
 
.739** 
(.019) 
.737** 
(.019) 
.737** 
(.019) 
.736** 
(.019) 
Therapeutic competitors* 
reference period 
   -.022** 
(.008) 
-.064** 
(.017) 
-.063** 
(.017) 
Branded therapeutic 
competitors* reference period 
    .061** 
(.016) 
.060** 
(.016) 
Herfindahl-index/100      .002 
(.002) 
Constant 1.738 ** 
(.019) 
1.733** 
(.019) 
.391** 
(.035) 
.393** 
(.035) 
.396** 
(.035) 
.446** 
(.051) 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 
Number of products 69 69 69 69 69 69 
R-squared  .36 .37 .68 .68 .69 .69 
**: significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average prices of drugs subject to reference pricing, their therapeutic competitors 
and the “others” group. 
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Figure 2. Average prices of brand-names and generics in the reference pricing group. 
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Figure 3. Average prices of brand-names and generics in the therapeutic competitor group. 
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Figure 4. Average prices of brand-names and generics in the “others” group. 
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Figure A1. Average prices of brand-names and generics in the reference pricing group when 
excluding generics with entry in the sample period. 
2
4
6
8
0 5 10 15 20 27 30 35 40 45
1 month periods, 2001-2004
price brand-names price generics
price cap
 
 
